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From the Editor
In this issue . . .
In the military publication genre there appears to be a growing tendency
to selectively focus reader attention on what many are labeling “the Pentagon’s
pivot to the Pacific.” The Asia-Pacific region and the national military strategy
to support America’s objectives there have always been of great import and
national interest. We are indeed fortunate to have as our lead article in this
issue a reminder by Lukas Milevski that the exercise of land warfare is a critical
component of any military strategy, regardless of region. In “Fortissimus Inter
Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” Milevski offers a word
of caution; that although much of the world may appear very “blue” on a map,
a unique demand still exists for the strategic effect that can only be delivered
through the taking and exercising of control generated by the employment of
landpower. The author concludes that although landpower cannot claim utility
in every contingency, it should be a major consideration for policymakers and
strategists in determining national policy objectives, grand strategy, and its
relationship with the other elements of national power.
Glenn A. Goddard provides insight into China’s future in “Chinese
Algebra: Understanding the Coming Changes of the Modern Chinese State.”
No, for those who vividly recall classroom failure during their high school
experience, this is not a test. It is, however, an in-depth analysis of China’s economic output, military spending, and population trends impacting that nation’s
future. The author utilizes an algebraic methodology to examine China’s current
standing in the Asia-Pacific region and its ability to compete with such regional
powers as Japan, South Korea, and India. Goddard closes with a warning for
the Chinese. If they are going to be successful in transforming their nation and
maintaining regional dominance, rapid and dramatic change is required.
“The Accidental Pirate: Reassessing the Legitimacy of Counterpiracy
Operations” is Stephen Anning and M. L. R. Smith’s examination of the piracy
problem off the coast of East Africa. The authors present a detailed examination
of the factors that inspire and sustain the current Somali piracy. Their analysis
goes beyond the contemporary nautical view of the piracy threat, to a broader
understanding that encompasses various matters related to the execution of land
warfare. They base their thesis on the British experience in Afghanistan where
a British Army “Influence” doctrine was implemented and Target Audience
Analysis (TAA) was exercised to achieve a better understanding of actions by
the local populace in various conflict zones. Specifically, the British applied a
TAA strategy known as “Shade-Shift,” developed from the understanding that
not all adversaries are necessarily political enemies and some may require a
response beyond direct military action.
Our thematic presentation “Then and Now” showcases three articles
examining foreign policy, strategy formulation, and civil-military relations
during various periods in world history. In each of the presentations, the author
offers a number of corollaries for events in today’s strategic environment.
David G. Fivecoat analyzes the Russian retreat from Afghanistan in “Leaving
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the Graveyard: The Soviet Union’s Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” The article
provides a brief history of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan during the
period 1985 to 1989, to include their withdrawal. The author analyzes four
specific aspects of the withdrawal: leadership, military strategy, transition
planning, and the economy. Of special interest to readers are the lessons from
the Soviet experience that appear applicable to America’s current situation in
Afghanistan. Of uncanny similarity is the emphasis on vigorous leadership,
timelines, and future aid. Fivecoat concludes that Afghanistan has taught harsh
lessons regarding the limits of power to a number of global hegemonies, but
the Soviet’s withdrawal was not one. The author espouses the belief that the
Soviet Union’s experience in Afghanistan suggests that with the proper aid
and advice Afghanistan can be successful in dealing with an insurgency following America’s withdrawal. Raymond Millen provides our second article
in this feature, “Cultivating Strategic Thinking: The Eisenhower Model.”
Millen’s thesis is based on the little appreciated understanding of President
Eisenhower’s unique approach to the formulation of security policy. The author
highlights the failure of most presidents to fully comprehend the art and science
of formulating grand strategy; more specifically, they appear to lack an understanding regarding the utilization of the National Security Council (NSC) in
the process. He highlights the fact that Eisenhower was the only president to
foster continual and extensive study, debate, and development of US national
security strategy. Millen closes with the reflection that although the qualities
of the Eisenhower NSC are largely forgotten, they are still relevant for today’s
national security professionals and strategists. The last article in the feature
is from Ethan S. Rafuse, who examines the problematic career of Civil War
General George B. McClellan. He provides readers excellent insight into the
tensions that often impede civil-military relations. “General McClellan and the
Politicians Revisited” presents the views of a number of military and political scholars related to the interaction between military and political spheres
throughout history. Rafuse readily admits there is a significant difference
between the maturity and scope of formal governing institutions today and
those of 1861 to 1862, but he also points out that the value of the actions by what
is known today as the interagency process was as equally compelling during
the Civil War. The author concludes that the case of George McClellan can be
a guide for how we think about civil-military relations.
“Cross Roads or Cross Purposes? Tensions Between Military and
Humanitarian Providers” is Solomon Major’s analysis of the tensions that often
appear between military and humanitarian nongovernmental (NGO) aid-givers
when both try to provide humanitarian assistance. He argues that both constituencies have their own hierarchy of interest. It is the organization’s perception
of the other’s hierarchy of interest that often gets in the way of success. The
author provides the reader with unique insight regarding the various type of
aid organizations and categories of assistance that can be rendered. He concludes with a suggestion to military professionals involved in humanitarian
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operations—consider the nature of the crisis and the type of NGO, then critically evaluate both in terms of consequence and appropriateness.
Matthew L. Merighi and Timothy A. Walton call for an improved US
defense strategy, one that entails a security assistance program capable of adequately empowering allies and partners to provide for their own security while
supporting the United States’ defense-industrial base. The authors base their
thesis on the fear that the struggling global economy, combined with shrinking
defense budgets, will curtail America’s foreign military aid and revenues available to defense contractors. They also suggest the United States, with a limited
defense budget, must find ways to maintain its industrial base while providing
for the nation’s security. They also suggest that an improved security assistance
program should be a major part of any such effort. Their strategic rationale
for increased security assistance is two-fold; it empowers regional partners
and allies, and it sustains the defense-industrial base through increased United
States exports. Merighi and Walton analyze the various security assistance programs and apparatus to conclude there is an immediate need to reform export
controls while emphasizing programs that focus on streamlining the process
and the number of people involved. They close with a call to unify security
assistance functions in similar structures across services and for the devolution of power to these organizations. The authors espouse the belief that such
actions would not adversely affect US foreign policy and could, in fact, increase
support of various human rights programs.
“Citizens in Uniform: Democratic Germany and the Changing
Bundeswehr” is Jens O. Koltermann’s analysis of the “Basic Law” that guided
Germany’s rebuilding of its military following two world wars. How the
Bundeswehr conformed to the Basic Law and its three guiding principles: Innere
Fuehrung, the corollary of “citizens in uniform,” and conscription of German
citizens for military service, underpin the author’s thesis. The author describes
how Innere Fuehrung, along with the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” assured
that the norms and values detailed in the German Basic Law were embedded in
the German military. Koltermann provides a detailed analysis of several paradigm changes impacting the modern German military: rearmament, to include
the former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr soldiers; the integration of former East
German soldiers; and the expansion to new global missions. American audiences will be especially understanding of the author’s analysis of a relatively
new paradigm—Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. The author calls
for the concept of the “citizen in uniform,” on which the Bundeswehr was originally founded, to be strengthened by the German Parliament so the military can
remain an integrated and accepted part of German society. Koltermann closes
with the warning that the success of the all-volunteer force is not a certainty,
and it will take a concentrated effort on the part of Germany’s political leadership to ensure this transition is successful.– RHT q

Summer 2012

5

